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Legal regulation of assisted 
procreation, genetic diagnosis and 
gene therapy 
Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun Pattinson' 
This report describes the legal regulation of assisted reproduction, genetic 
diagnosis, and gene therapy within the countries of the EU, and presents a 
framework for classifying the moral and philosophical issues. It has two 
parts. 
In the first part, we describe the regulation of assisted reproduction, 
embryo research, cloning, germ-line gene therapy, pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), and prenatal diagnosis (PND) and abortion. 
Where legislation exists, it typically prohibits reproductive cloning and 
germ-line gene therapy, either prohibits non-therapeutic embryo research 
or subjects it to conditions (such as a 14 day cut-off point), permits abor- 
tion and PND, and regulates those assisted reproductive techniques that 
involve the storage or use of embryos outside the body. However, there is 
far less convergence on issues such as the permissibility of PGD, and the 
use of medically assisted reproduction by single women and homosexual 
couples. 
In the second part, we outline a framework for understanding the moral 
and philosophical issues raised by these regulatory approaches. This 
framework classifies positions according to the level of non-derivative or 
intrinsic moral status granted to the embryo or fetus (hereafter embryo- 
fetus), and the ground offered for this level of intrinsic moral status, 
thereby highlighting the extent of dissensus in this area. 
We conclude by selecting a number of issues that could usefully be 
addressed by future research. 
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1 Eligibility criteria for access to assisted reproduction 
Table 1 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Legislation 
Act No. 275 of 
1 July 1992.2 
None. ' 
Law No. 499 of 
12 June 1996 on 
Biomedical Re- 
search. 
Law No. 460 of 
1997 on Med- 
ically Assisted 
Reproduction! 
Legislative Eligibility Techniques Subject 
Criteria to the Eligibility 
Criteria 
Must be a married couple 
or stable heterosexual 
cohabitee, and be deem- 
ed able to provide a satis- 
factory home for the 
child (s. 2(1)). ' 
Artificial insemin- 
ation, IVF, GIFT, & 
embryo transfer. ' 
All other treatments for 
infertility must have 
proved unsuccessful or 
be considered hopeless. ` 
Not applicable (hereafter 
N/A). 
N/A. 
In practice, assisted re- 
production is available 
for single and lesbian 
women at more than five 
Flemish centres. ' 
None. " 
In practice, treatment is 
restricted to women who 
are 
(a) married or have been 
cohabiting for 3 
years; io 
(b) under 37 years at the 
time of entry onto 
the waiting list; 
(c) without children; & 
No information on 
the techniques that 
are subject to eli- 
gibility criteria in 
practice. 
Artificial insemin- 
ation, IVF, and di- 
rectly related tech- 
niques. " 
There are a few 
provisions in rela- 
tion to practitioners 
concerning inform- 
ation and consent 
with regard to as- 
sisted reproduction 
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(d) have a medical need 
for treatment. 
generally (ss. 23 & 
24 Law No. 460). 12 
These provisions 
are not concerned 
with eligibility as 
such. 
Finland None. " N/A. N/A. 
France 
Proposed legis- The proposed legislation 
lation exists. 14 restricts access to cou- 
ples who are married or 
cohabiting, who are 
involuntarily childless or 
whose offspring are 
likely to inherit a serious 
disease. Also, the woman 
must be under 50 years 
old. `5 
In practice, assisted re- 
production is, at present, 
only offered to married 
couples and heterosexual 
cohabitees. 1 ' 
Law 94-654 of Must be 
29 July 1994.18 (a) a couple consisting 
of a man and a 
woman; 
(b) alive, i. e., posthu- 
mous insemination 
is prohibited; 
(c) married or able to 
prove at least 2 years 
cohabitation; and 
(d) of reproductive age 
(Art. L-152-2). 19 
Treatment is only to be 
provided to alleviate in- 
fertility or to avoid the 
transmission of a par- 
The proposed legis- 
lation covers arti- 
ficial insemination, 
IVF, and related 
techniques. " 
No information on 
the techniques that 
are subject to eli- 
gibility criteria in 
practice. 
(a) Clinical & bio- 
logical practi- 
ces for IVF; 
(b) transfer of em- 
bryos; 
(c) artificial inse- 
mination; and 
(d) all techniques 
having similar 
results that use 
assisted repro- 
duction outside 
of the natural 
process (Art. 
L-151-1). 2' 
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ticularly serious disease 
Germany Embryo Protect- 
ion Act 1990. 
IVF is also cov- 
ered by guide- 
lines of the Fed- 
eral Physicians' 
Chamber. " 
(Art. 8). 20 
None. Any technique in- 
volving the in vitro 
production or use of 
an embryo (s. 1). 
The legislation is sup- 
plemented by guidelines 
of the Federal Physic- 
ians' Chamber, which re- 
quire physicians to 
ensure that the couple are 
in a stable relationship. 
These guidelines state 
that, in principle, access 
should be restricted to 
married couples. A 
specific committee has 
the power to consider the 
case of unmarried per- 
sons. So, in practice, 
assisted reproduction is 
typically offered to 
married couples only. " 
Greece No specific leg- N/A. 
islation. 
However, s. 59 
of Law 2071 of 
July 1992 pro- 
vides for a pres- 
idential decree 
that will reg- 
ulate the est- 
ablishment and 
function of units 
for artificial fer- 
tilisation. This 
decree has not 
yet been is- 
sued. 24 
N/A. 
In practice, assisted No information on 
reproduction is only of- the eligibility crite- 
fered to married couples na that are used in 
and heterosexual cohab- practice. 
itees. 25 
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Ireland 
Italy 
None. 26 
Assisted repro- 
duction is car- 
ried out under 
guidelines of the 
Medical Counc- 
il. '' 
None. 29 
Proposed 
legislation 
exists. 30 
N/A. 
Under the guidelines, 
IVF may only take place 
with married couples. 2S 
NIA. 
Code of Medical Deont- 
ology 1995 (which pro- 
vides guidance for phy- 
sicians) prohibits in- 
semination outside stable 
heterosexual couples, af- 
ter the death of one of 
the partners, and for 
elderly women, and pro- 
hibits any form of surro- 
gacy. " Also, under the 
Code, IVF is only avail- 
able where there is a 
medical need for treat- 
32 ment. 
Some clinics in Italy 
were, however, among 
the first to treat post- 
menopausal women. " 
Under the proposed leg- 
islation, access to assis- 
ted reproduction is grant- 
ed to married or stable 
heterosexual couples of 
potentially fertile aged 
52 or less (Art. 5). " 
N/A. 
No information on 
the eligibility crite- 
ria that are used in 
practice. 
N/A. 
The techniques co- 
vered by the pro- 
posed legislation in- 
clude IVF, artificial 
insemination, and 
related techniques. 35 
In practice, Catho- 
lic hospitals, subject 
to Vatican in- 
struction, do not 
perform I VF, al- 
though some under- 
take GIFT. 36 
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Luxem- 
bourg 
None. 
Netherlands Hospitals Act. 
Decree on IVF 
Planning 1989.38 
Portugal None. 41 
Spain 
Sweden 
A Draft Bill is 
currently under 
consideration. 42 
Law 35 of Nov- 
ember 1988. 
Unimplemented, 
due to challenge 
as unconstitu- 
tional on enact- 
ment. Therefore, 
the provision of 
assisted repro- 
duction is curr- 
ently subject to 
professional 
self-regulation. " 
N/A. N/A 
In practice, no assisted 
reproduction services are 
available. " 
None. '9 No information. 
In practice, most IVF 
centres adopt an age 
limit of 40 for the 
woman. 40 
N/A. 
In practice, offered to 
stable heterosexual cou- 
ples. " 
No information about the 
techniques covered by 
the Draft Bill. 
None. Under s. 6 `every 
woman' is eligible for 
treatment as long as she 
provides her written 
consent, is at least 
eighteen, and is mentally 
competent. 
No information on 
the eligibility crite- 
ria used in practice. 
N/A. 
In practice, there is 
currently only limit- 
ed provision for 
donor insemination, 
IVF, & GIFT. 
No information on 
the eligibility crite- 
ria imposed under 
the Draft Bill. 
Unimplemented 
law covers IVF, 
GIFT, artificial in- 
semination, and re- 
lated techniques. 
Law No. 711 of Donor insemination and IVF, artificial in- 
14 June 1988 on IVF are restricted to semination, and 
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IVF. married couples or 
cohabitees who have 
Law No. 1140 been in a relationship for 
of 20 December at least 2 years (s. 2 Law 
1984 on In- No. 1140, & s. 2 of Law 
semination. `5 1988, respectively). ' 
The couple must be 
unable to have children 
by natural means. "" 
UK4' Human Fertili- Account must be taken of 
sation and Em- the welfare of any child 
bryology Act who will be born or 
1990. affected as a result of 
treatment (including the 
need for a father of any 
child born as a result of 
treatment): s. 13(5). 
In practice, clinics often 
use criteria based on age, 
medical history, duration 
of infertility, and likeli- 
hood of success. "' 
related treatments. 
A licence is re- 
quired for treat- 
ments or proce- 
dures that involve 
(a) creation, stor- 
age, or use of 
embryos out- 
side the body 
(ss. 3(1), 1(2) 
& 1(3)); or 
(a) storage or 
donation of 
gametes 
(s. 4(1)). 
Increased public awareness of medically assisted reproduction has brought 
with it a growing demand for these services. This demand, operating in an 
area of limited resources and great moral controversy, has resulted in 
access to these services being subject to limitation, often in the form of 
legislative eligibility criteria. 
Table 1 shows diverse legislative criteria. " At one extreme is legislation, 
like the French legislation, which effectively prohibits the use of assisted 
reproduction for homosexual couples, single women, non-cohabiting 
heterosexual couples, surrogate women, and post-menopausal women. " 
Where the couple seeking access to assisted reproduction is unmarried, 
both the French and Swedish legislation require cohabitation for at least 
two years, whereas in Austria no specific period of cohabitation is 
required. 
A much more permissive approach has been adopted by the UK Act, 
which provides for any woman to have treatment, provided that account is 
taken of the welfare of any child who will be born or affected as a result of 
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the treatment. This includes consideration of the need for a father of any 
child born as a result of treatment, which places a heavier burden on non- 
heterosexual couples, but does not exclude anyone. "Z Like the Danish 
legislation, the unimplemented Spanish law is even more permissive, 
because it explicitly states that `every woman' is eligible for access to 
assisted reproduction. 
Since the Spanish law has not yet been fully implemented, the de facto 
position in Spain is shaped by non-legislative mechanisms, such as profes- 
sional guidelines, rather like countries such as Belgium, Greece, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, and Portugal, which have no legislation governing access to 
assisted reproduction. This does not mean that assisted reproduction is 
available to everyone in those countries. In fact, even where legislative 
eligibility criteria exist, clinics often have discretionary power to impose 
additional eligibility requirements. What this means is that, in some coun- 
tries, harsh de facto eligibility criteria apply. For example, in Ireland 
assisted reproduction is only offered to married couples; in Belgium, 
Finland, and Greece, access is restricted to married or cohabiting hetero- 
sexuals; and in Luxembourg, no such services are offered at all (see 
Schenker 1997, p. 174). 
Overall, the countries of the EU impose three levels of legislative eligi- 
bility criteria on those who are not part of a heterosexual couple: either the 
eligibility criteria exclude such persons from access to assisted reproduc- 
tion (e. g., France), place harsher requirements on them (e. g., UK), or 
provide such persons with equal opportunity of access (e. g., Spain). 
Further, where non-heterosexuals are excluded, there is often a require- 
ment that the heterosexual couple be married or cohabiting for a stated 
period. And, the eligibility criteria applied in practice are often far stricter 
than the legislative position would imply. 
However, legislative eligibility criteria are not applied to all medical 
assistance to reproduce. For example, in the UK the need to consider the 
welfare of any potentially affected child only applies to treatments or 
procedures that involve the creation, storage, or use of embryos outside the 
body, or the storage or donation of gametes. This means that many assisted 
reproductive techniques, such as artificial insemination and gamete intra- 
fallopian treatment (GIFT) using non-donated gametes, are not subject to 
legislative eligibility criteria. 
Similar limitations apply to the legislation of other countries. For exam- 
ple, the Austrian, Danish, " French, German, Spanish, and Swedish legisla- 
tion cover IVF, artificial insemination, and directly related techniques 
only. This means that many medical responses to infertility are not subject 
to legislative eligibility criteria, including 
(a) surgical repair of damaged fallopian tubes; 
(b) general practitioner advice; and 
222 
(c) the prescription of drugs to maintain and procure pregnancy. 
So far we have concentrated on those countries that have legislation 
governing access to assisted reproduction. Legislative assemblies have not, 
however, been particularly quick or successful in their attempts to intro- 
duce legislation. This is not because assisted reproduction is thought to be 
uncontroversial or to lack priority. It is because it has proven to be too 
controversial. For example, since the rejection of the first proposed legis- 
lation fifteen years ago, Italy has found itself unable to reach sufficient 
political consensus for legislative intervention. "' Belgium has faced similar 
difficulties-as illustrated by the refusal of the King to sign the Abortion 
Act in 1990 (see Schotsmans 1998, p. 2). Ironically, as a result, both Italy 
and Belgium are, by default, among the most permissive countries in 
Europe. 
In such countries, specific legislation is not likely to be absent for long- 
for example, Portugal is likely to enact legislation in the very near future- 
but its present absence does show that assisted reproduction can be 
successfully regulated by non-legislative means and it shows that the 
controversiality of assisted reproduction is not simply a matter of the 
newness of the techniques. 
1.2 Embryo research 
Table 2.1 
Country Legislation Legality of embryo research 
Austria Act on Procrea- Embryo research is prohibited, though 
tive Medicine examination and treatment may be allowed if 
No. 275 of I it is necessary to achieve a pregnancy (Art. 
July 1992. " 1U) 56 
There is a fine for violations' 
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Belgium None. 58 Embryo research is permitted by default. 60 
Denmark 
Proposed legis- 
lation exists. 59 
Law No. 499 of 
12 June 1996 on 
Biomedical 
Research. 
Law No. 460 of 
1997, on Assis- 
ted Reproduct- 
ion, ss. 25-28. 
In practice, only two of the Free Universities 
undertake embryo research. "' 
The Committee of Medical Ethics of the 
National Scientific Research Fund recom- 
mends that embryo research should seek to 
enhance the chance of implantation in the 
uterus and not be performed after 14 days. 
Under Art. 5 of the proposed legislation, the 
creation of embryos in vitro for scientific re- 
search is prohibited, except: 
(a) after a decision of a special commission, 
conforming to the procedure in Art. 10(1); 
(b) where the research cannot be done using 
supernumerary embryos; and 
(c) all the other provisions of the proposed 
law are fulfilled. 
Thus, the creation of embryos for research will 
be allowed, subject to certain conditions. "' 
The collection and fertilisation of eggs for 
research is allowed under certain conditions, 
such as the agreement of a regional ethics 
committee. " 
Research must seek to improve IVF tech- 
niques. ' 
Fertilised eggs can only be kept in vitro up to 
14 days (excluding any periods of cryopre- 
servation). bs 
Fertilised eggs subjected to research cannot be 
transferred to the womb, unless this can 
happen with no risk of transferring genetic 
diseases, malformations, etc. (Ch. 4(3)/(4)). ' 
Research involving the fusion of genetically 
different embryos or parts of embryos is not 
permitted. " 
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Finland 
France 
Act on Medical 
Research No. 
488 of 1999. 
Law 94-654 of 
29 July 1994 & 
Decree 97-578 
of 28 May 1997, 
which form part 
of the Public 
Health Code. 70 
Embryo research is permitted under licence up 
to 14 days after fertilisation (excluding periods 
of cryopreservation) (s. 11). The consent of the 
gamete donors has to be obtained in writing 
(s. 12). 
Creation of embryos for research is prohibited. 
Fertilised eggs that have been subject to 
research cannot be transferred to the womb, 
and they are not to be kept alive for more than 
14 days after fertilisation. The maximum time 
limit for cryopreservation of embryos to be 
used for research is 15 years after which the 
embryos are to be disposed of (s. 13). 
Violation of ss. 11 or 13 is sanctioned by up to 
I year imprisonment or a fine (s. 25). Viola- 
tion of s. 12 is sanctioned by a fine (s. 
27). 69 
In vitro conception of human embryos for 
research is prohibited (Art. L-152-8). " 
In `exceptional' circumstances, the couple may 
permit studies to be carried out on the embryo, 
provided they give written consent, and the 
studies have a medical purpose, do not impair 
the embryo, and have the approval of the 
Comite National d'Ethique (Art. 152-8). '2 
Thus, only non-destructive (therapeutic) 
research is possible. " 
Any embryo research must have a direct 
advantage to the embryo concerned or con- 
tribute to the improvement of medically 
assisted reproduction techniques. 
Research is limited to the seventh day after 
fertilisation. " 
Any violation of the law is severely sanctioned 
(7 years imprisonment and FF 700,000 pen- 
alty). 75 
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Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Embryo Protect- 
ion Act 1990.76 
None. 
The Eighth Am- 
endment to the 
Constitution 
(Art. 40.3.3). 8° 
No specific leg- 
islation. 
None. 
Proposed legis- 
lation exists. " 
Luxembourg None. 
It is an offence to 
(a) fertilise a human egg for any purpose 
other than to start a pregnancy in the 
woman who produced the egg (Art. 1(2)); 
(b) use an embryo for any purpose other than 
its maintenance and healthy development 
(Art. 2(1)); and 
(c) separate and use totipotent cells of an 
embryo for research and diagnosis. " 
Thus, non-therapeutic embryo research is 
prohibited. 
Violation of the law is severely sanctioned by 
imprisonment up to 3 years or a fine (s. 2). 'g 
Embryo research is permitted by default. ' 
The Greek Central Council for Health has 
recommended that research on embryos should 
be permitted only during the first 14 days from 
fertilisation (excluding any period of storage). 
Implicitly prohibited. " 
Also, practically impossible because the 
Medical Council's ethical guidelines require 
all embryos to be transferred to the woman's 
body. ' 
No research is being conducted on human 
embryos. " 
Embryo research is permitted by default. Most 
is performed with the aim of improving the 
success rate of IVF/GIFT. " 
The proposed legislation prohibits the produc- 
tion of embryos for research, along with all 
non-therapeutic embryo research. ' 
No embryo research is being performed. 
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Netherlands None. B7 Embryo research is permitted by default. The 
Health Council has recommended that an 
embryo should not be grown in vitro beyond 
14 days following fertilisation. " 
Proposed The Dutch government is currently preparing a 
legislation law that is in tune with this recommendation. 90 
exists. " 
Portugal None. "' Embryo research is permitted by default. The 
National Council of Ethics for the Life Sci- 
ences has declared that the production of 
embryos for research is `ethically unaccept- 
able'. "' 
Spain Law 35 of Nov- Under the unimplemented law, research is 
ember 1998. permitted on non-viable embryos up to 14 
days after fertilisation, provided the parties 
Challenged as concerned give their written consent 
unconstitutional (ss. 15(1)/(3) & 20). 
on enactment. 93 
Research can only be conducted on viable 
embryos if it is applied research of a diagnos- 
tic character or if it has a therapeutic or pro- 
phylactic purpose, and the non-pathological 
genetic patrimony is not modified (s. 15)(2)). 
A committee reviews each proposal' 
Research must have a purpose laid down in 
s. 16, such as the improvement of the tech- 
niques of assisted reproduction, or increasing 
knowledge about infertility, gene and chromo- 
some structure, contraception, or the origin of 
genetic and hereditary diseases. 
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Sweden Law No. 115 of 
14 March 1991 
on Research or 
Treatment with 
Fertilised Hu- 
man Eggs. 95 
UK Human Fertilis- 
ation & Embry- 
ology Act 1990. 
Surplus embryos may be used for research with 
the consent of the couple undergoing treatment 
(s. 1)., 
Embryos that have been subjected to experi- 
ments must be destroyed at the end of the 14th 
day (s. 2). 97 
No gametes or embryos that have been the 
subject of research can be transferred to the 
woman's body (s. 4). 98 
The research must be related to the improve- 
ment of IVF techniques and approved by an 
ethics committee. " 
Research on embryos is permitted under 
licence up to the appearance of the primitive 
streak or up to 14 days after fertilisation, 
whichever is the earliest (ss. 1(3)(a) & 1(4)). 
The creation of embryos specifically for 
research is permitted under licence (Sch. 2, 
para. 3(1)). 
Any research must be `necessary or desirable' 
for promoting advances in the treatment of 
infertility; congenital disease; miscarriage; 
conception; or gene/chromosome abnormalities 
(Sch. 2, para. 3(2)). 
Legal regulation of embryo research seeks to balance respect for nascent 
human life with the benefits that can be produced by advances in scientific 
knowledge. Given the emotive nature of embryo research, it is no surprise to 
discover that this regulatory balance is far from uniform. In fact, all possible 
regulatory approaches can be seen in the EU. This is displayed in Table 2.2 
overleaf. 
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Table 2.2 
Legislative Approach Non-Legislative Approach 
Permitted subject to Prohibited (unless Permitted by de- Prohibited by 
conditions therapeutic) fault default 
Denmark Austria Belgium Ireland 
Finland Germany Greece Luxembourg 
France (except- Italy 
ionally if non-im- Netherlands 
pairing) Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
A minority of EU countries-Austria and Germany-prohibit embryo 
research by legislation; the majority of those with legislation permitting it 
subject to a number of conditions. For example, the Danish, Finnish, 
Spanish, Swedish, and the UK legislation permit embryo research up to 14 
days after fertilisation, and French legislation permits embryo research 
which doesn't impair the embryo in `exceptional' circumstances (but only 
up to 7 days after fertilisation). After this period, the destruction of the 
embryo is typically required (France being an exception). Moreover, where 
embryo research is permitted, the purposes of such research are often 
prescribed. For example, as table 2.1 shows, the Spanish and UK legisla- 
tion require embryo research to be for a purpose laid down in the legisla- 
tion. 
Where no specific legislation has been enacted, embryo research is either 
permitted or prohibited by the legal and cultural tradition of the individual 
country. For example, in Ireland, the Medical Council's ethical guidelines 
require all embryos to be transferred to the woman's body (see MacKellar 
1997, p. 17), and the Eighth Amendment to the constitution also implicitly 
prohibits embryo research by declaring that 
[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right. 
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Consequently, in Ireland, no research is being conducted on human 
embryos. In contrast, in countries such as Belgium, Greece, and Italy 
embryo research is permitted in the absence of any relevant legislative 
response. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine could have 
a dramatic effect on these countries. Article 18(l) of this Convention states 
that 
[w]here the law allows research on embryos in vitro, it shall ensure 
adequate protection of the embryo. 
The term `adequate protection' is not defined. So for those countries 
unable to make a reservation by invoking their pre-existing law under 
Article 36, signing the Convention might have the effect of hindering (or 
perhaps even prohibiting) embryo research. Indeed, Article 18(2) states 
that `[t]he creation of human embryos for research purposes is prohibited'. 
1.3 Cloning 
Table 3 
Country Legislation Legislative provisions concerning clonin 
additional to those addressing embry 
research 
Austria Act No. 275 of 1 Cloning is indirectly prohibited. 10' 
July 1992.100 
Belgium None. None. 
Legislation cover- 
ing medical ethics 
including cloning is 
currently being con- 
sidered by Parlia- 
ment. 102 
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Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Law No. 499 of 12 
June 1996 on Bio- 
medical Research. 
Law No. 460 of 
1997 on Assisted 
Reproduction. ' o3 
Act on Medical 
Research No. 488 
of 1999. 
Laws 94-653 and 
94-654 of 29 July 
1994.106 
Embryo Protection 
Act 1990 (s. 6). 
None 
Research on, and assisted reproductive 
treatment with the aim of, producing 
genetically identical individuals is prohib- 
ited, as is nuclear substitution. '" 
Conducting medical research for the 
purpose of facilitating the cloning human 
beings is a criminal offence and sanctioned 
by up to 2 years imprisonment or a fine 
(s. 26). cos 
The embryo research that would be neces- 
sary to clone a human being is prohibited 
(see above, 1.2). Thus, human cloning is 
implicitly prohibited. 107 
The Consultative National Ethics Com- 
mittee for Health and Life Sciences 
(CCNE), in its Opinion No. 54 of 22 April 
1997, opposed the production of identical 
human beings. 108 It also recommended that 
the ban should be made more explicit 
when the legislation is revised in 1999.109 
It is an offence to create an embryo that is 
genetically identical to another embryo, 
fetus, or any living or dead person. "' 
The Act does not define the term `geneti- 
cally identical'. "' 
The Greek Central Council for Health has 
recommended that assisted reproduction 
should not be used for the creation of 
genetically identical human beings. 12 
Ireland None. The legal position is uncertain. "' 
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Italy 
Luxembourg None. 
Ministerial Decree 
of 5 March 1997. "" 
Such decrees have 
legal force for only 
90 days unless con- 
verted by a vote of 
Parliament, which 
did not happen 
here. "S 
The decree prohibited all forms of experi- 
mentation and intervention aimed at (even 
indirectly) cloning a human or animal. "' 
The National Bioethics Committee (CNB) 
has expressed the view that cloning should 
be prohibited. "" 
None. 
Netherlands None. 
Portugal 
Proposed legislation The Dutch government proposes to pro- 
exists. »8 hibit the cloning of human beings, but 
permit the use of cloning techniques in 
embryo research (before 14 days after 
conception) in forthcoming legislation. j9 
None. ' 2° The National Council of Ethics for the Life 
Sciences has expressed its opinion that the 
cloning of human beings is `ethically 
unacceptable' and must be prohibited'. 121 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Law 35 of Novemb- It is a criminal offence to create identical 
er 1998 (s. 20), and human beings, by cloning or other proce- 
Title V of the Penal dures aimed at race selection. 
Code (s. 161(2)). 122 
Law No. 115 of 14 Embryo and oocyte cloning is implicitly 
March 1991. prohibited with criminal sanctions. 'Z' 
Human Fertilisation Licences are required for the nuclear 
& Embryology Act substitution of an embryo (s. 3(3)(d)), and 
1990. for the creation of an embryo outside of 
the body (ss. 3(l)(a) and 1(2)), where an 
embryo is defined as a live egg that has 
been fertilised or is in the process of 
fertilisation (ss. 1(1)(a) and (b)). 
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The licensing authority believes that the 
latter encompasses somatic cell nuclear 
transfer. 124 
The regulation of human cloning-the deliberate creation of a human 
being that is genetically identical to another human being or has the same 
nuclear gene set as another human being-is patchy. "' Where legislation 
within the EU countries does address cloning, it is often influenced by the 
previous scientific orthodoxy that cloning by nuclear substitution would be 
done either by replacing the nucleus of an embryo, or replacing the nucleus 
of an egg with a nucleus from an embryonic cell. In other words, somatic 
cell nuclear transfer-where the nucleus of an egg cell is replaced with a 
nucleus of a somatic cell taken from an adult-was not considered to be a 
possibility before the creation of the sheep named `Dolly'. " It follows that 
the application of the `Dolly technique' to human beings might evade 
legislative provisions that have been drafted too narrowly. 
The UK legislation provides an interesting case. In addition to the 
licensing requirement imposed on the storage, use, or creation of an 
embryo outside the body, the UK legislation prohibits the granting of a 
licence for the nuclear substitution of an embryo. This has led the Human 
Genetic Advisory Commission (HGAC) and the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) to declare that, depending on the method 
used, cloning is either prohibited or subject to a licensing requirement. "' 
Surely, it might be objected, cloning using the Dolly technique does not 
involve the creation of an embryo, because an embryo is defined under the 
Act as `a live human embryo where fertilisation is complete', including `an 
egg in the process of fertilisation'. As Dr. Wilmut and Professor Bulfield 
put it 
[t]he oocyte is an egg but it has not been fertilised and it never is 
fertilised because the nucleus is transferred to 
it. 128 
However, in practice, it is very likely that the term `fertilisation' will be 
judicially construed to include the nuclear substitution of an egg, especially 
since the HFEA seems to be acting according to this construction of the 
term. '" 
If fertilisation includes cloning using the Dolly technique, it is interesting 
to note that 
[t]he HFEA's policy is that it will not license any research which has 
reproductive cloning as its aim. (HGAC and HFEA 1998a, paragraph 
5.4, p. 11)10 
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What this means is that, although cloning a human using somatic cell 
nuclear transfer is not prohibited in the UK, insofar as it is caught by the 
legislation, it is just about impossible to do it legally. "' 
Another example of legislation that was clearly intended to prohibit 
cloning is the German Embryo Protection Act (Embryonenschutzgesetz) 
1990. Section Six of this Act renders it an offence to create an embryo that 
is genetically identical to another embryo, fetus, or any living or dead 
person. Many believe that this provision is sufficient to prohibit cloning by 
any method (see, e. g., Winter 1997). However, the Act does not define the 
term `genetically identical', so it is questionable whether it is wide enough 
to encompass a clone produced by somatic cell nuclear transfer whose 
mitochondrial DNA will not be identical to that of the nuclear DNA 
donor. '32 Even if it is not, given that the clear intention of this provision 
was to prohibit cloning by any method, and the fact that this act invokes 
penal sanctions for activities such as conducting embryo research, it would 
be extremely unwise to attempt to clone a human being in Germany. 
A slightly different position exists in Spain, where the creation of identi- 
cal human beings-by cloning or any other method-is a criminal offence 
only where it is aimed at race selection. This provision is clearly wide 
enough to encompass the development of any new cloning technique, and 
is particularly interesting because it indicates that the Spanish legislature 
does not find cloning objectionable per se, but instead objects to the racism 
that it can be used to express. 
In general, cloning by nuclear transfer is either prohibited expressly (as 
in Germany) or implicitly (as in Sweden), or not addressed by the legisla- 
ture at all (as in Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). It is 
likely that cloning by any method will soon become illegal in just about all 
the EU countries, because of the pressure for a global legal ban on the 
development and use of this technique on human beings. In fact, ten of the 
fifteen EU countries have now signed the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine and its additional protocol on the prohibition of 
cloning human beings. 133 This protocol makes what was implicit in the 
Convention134 explicit by declaring that 
[a]ny intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identi- 
cal to another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited. 
(Article 1(1)) 
Since `genetically identical' is defined as `sharing with another the same 
nuclear gene set' (Article 1(2)), somatic cell nuclear transfer is included 
within this prohibition. 
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The term `human being' is also not defined in the Convention, so the 
Netherlands, when it signed the Convention and its protocol, added an 
interpretative statement stating that 
[i]n relation to Article I of the Protocol, the Government of the King- 
dom of the Netherlands declares that it interprets the term `human 
beings' as referring exclusively to a human individual, i. e., a human 
being who has been born. 15 
This statement aims to make room for cloning experiments on embryos 
within the first fourteen days after fertilisation. 
There are a number of other international instruments banning human 
cloning. "' For example, in November 1997, UNESCO published the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, which 
stated in Article 11, 
[p]ractices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive 
cloning of human beings shall not be permitted. "' 
Also, the EC has recently passed a Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions (Directive 98/441EC), which states in Article 
6(2)(a) that `processes for cloning human beings' are unpatentable. This is 
very likely to act as a disincentive for commercial research and investment 
into cloning. "' 
1.4 Germ-line gene therapy 
Table 4 
Country Legislative provisions concerning germ-line gene therapy in 
addition to those addressing embryo research 
Austria Act on Procreative Medicine 275/1992 prohibits germ-line gene 
therapy (Art. 9(2)). 19 
Belgium None. 
Denmark Under Law No. 460 of 1997, eggs and sperm must not be geneti- 
cally modified. Germ-line gene therapy is not permitted. 10 
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Finland Act on Medical Research No. 488 of 1999 prohibits research on 
embryos or gametes for the purpose of developing methods to 
alter hereditary characteristics, unless it aims to find a cure or to 
prevent a severe hereditary disease (s. 15). Violation is sanctioned 
by up to 1 year imprisonment or a fine (s. 25). 
The working group (set up by the Ministry of Justice) reporting 
on the use of gametes and embryos in assisted fertilisation had 
proposed that no gametes or embryos be used in assisted fertilisa- 
tion where the genetic heritage has been modified. 14' 
France Law 94-654 of 29 July 1994 prohibits germ-line gene therapy and 
germ-line genetic manipulations. 142 
Germany Embryo Protection Act 1990 explicitly prohibits germ-line gene 
therapy (Art. 5(1)/(2). )'43 
Ireland None. 
Greece None. 
Italy None. 
Luxembourg No information. 
Netherlands None. 
The Health Council has recommended a moratorium on human 
germ-line gene therapy. 
Portugal None. 
Spain Under s. 15(2)(b) of the unimplemented'44 Law 35 of November 
1998, research on viable embryos can only be conducted where 
`the non-pathological genetic patrimony is not modified'. 
Sweden Under Law 115 of 1991, research to develop techniques for 
achieving hereditary alterations (germ-line interventions) is 
forbidden (s. 2). 1°5 
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UK Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, a 
treatment licence cannot `authorise altering the genetic structure 
of any cell while it forms part of an embryo' (Sch. 2, para. 1(4)), 
and the same is true of a research licence, `except in such circum- 
stances (if any) as may be specified in or determined in pursuance 
of regulations' (Sch. 2, para. 3(4)). 
Like cloning by nuclear transfer, germ-line gene therapy-which involves 
modifying genes so that they can be passed on to future generations-has 
not yet been successfully performed on humans and has a consensus 
against its use. Consequently, where germ-line gene therapy and its associ- 
ated research is addressed by legislation, it is either prohibited or heavily 
restricted. 
The Austrian, Danish, French, German, and Swedish legislation 
expressly prohibit germ therapy. Even the usually permissive UK Act 
prohibits germ-line gene therapy, and permits its associated research only 
where it is allowed by regulation. However, no such regulation currently 
exists. 
Slightly different approaches are adopted by the Spanish and Finnish 
legislation. The Spanish legislation prohibits embryo research where the 
non-pathological genetic patrimony is modified, and the Finnish legislation 
goes further by explicitly permitting germ-line gene therapy where it aims 
to find a cure for, or prevent, a serious hereditary disease. 
Germ-line gene therapy might also be permitted by default in some 
countries that have no specific legislation. Such countries include Belgium, 
Greece, and Italy. 
Once again, the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi- 
cine might have an effect on this, because Article 13 declares, 
[a]n intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be 
undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and 
only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of 
any descendants. 
Where a signatory country does not, or is unable to, make a reservation 
under Article 36 in regard to this provision, it would appear that germ-line 
gene therapy is prohibited. 
As with cloning, the prohibitive inclinations of the European Convention 
are shared by many other international instruments. For example, Article 
24 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
states that the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO should 
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contribute to dissemination of the principles set out in the Declaration and 
make recommendations to the General Conference 
in particular regarding the identification of practices that could be 
contrary to human dignity, such as germ-line interventions'. (Our 
emphasis)' 
Also, Article 6(2)(b) of the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions declares that `processes for modifying the 
germ line genetic identity of human beings' are unpatentable. " 
1.5 Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) 
Table 5.1 
Country Legislation Legality of PGD 
Austria Act on Procrea- Implicitly forbidden, because under s. 9(1), 
tive Medicine gametes and pre-implantation embryos14' are 
No. 275 of I only permitted to be medically examined and 
July 1992. treated to the extent necessary to establish a 
pregnancy. 
Belgium None. 149 Permitted by default. 
Denmark Clinical use: 
Law No. 460 of 
1997, ss. 7 and 
2 1. ßs' 
Research: 
see Table 2.1. 
A licence is required to establish a centre for 
genetics. 'so 
Implicitly permitted. 
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Finland None. Permitted by default. "' 
Proposed legis- A working group report, given to the Ministry 
lation exists. 152 of Justice in 1997, recommended that the use 
of assisted reproduction should not be allowed 
for the purpose of choosing a child's sex or 
characteristics, except to avoid serious he- 
reditary sex-related disease. 1S4 
France Law 94-654 of Authorised by a law that requires the publica- 
29 July 1994. tion of a further decree, which has not been 
issued. Thus, PGD is currently impossible in 
France. "' 
The unimplemented law allows PGD only 
where 
(a) it is undertaken in a centre licensed by the 
`National Commission of Medicine and 
Biology of Human Reproduction and 
Prenatal Diagnosis'; and 
(b) the couple in question provides written 
consent and has a high probability of pro- 
ducing a child with a severe and incurable 
genetic defect (Art. 162-17). ` 
Germany Embryo Protec- It is an offence to fertilise a human egg for 
tion Act 1990. any purpose other than to start a pregnancy in 
the woman who produced the egg. ' S7 Also, the 
removal of a totipotent cell is prohibited. 158 
Thus, PGD is implicitly prohibited. 
Greece None. 159 Permitted by default. '6" 
Ireland None. Any diagnosis of the pre-implantation embryo 
is implicitly prohibited, as the Eighth 
Amendment states, `[t]he State acknowledges 
the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindi- 
cate that right'. 
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Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
None. Permitted by default. 
No information. No information. 
None. Permitted by default. 161 
Clinical research will fall within the forth- 
coming Medical Research Involving Human 
Subjects Act. 112 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
None. No information. 
Law 35 of Nov- 
ember 1998. 
Since this was 
challenged as un- 
constitutional on 
the 
of 
PGD is currently 
subject to pro- 
fessional self- 
regulation. 
enactment, 
provision 
Permitted under the unimplemented law. 
Assisted reproduction is expressly allowed 
for the prevention and treatment of illnesses 
of a genetic or hereditary origin (s. 12(1)). 
However, genetic selection for non- 
pathological characteristics is prohibited 
(s. 13). 
Law No. 115 of Permitted only for the diagnosis of serious, 
14 March 1991. progressive, hereditary disease that leads to 
premature death and for which there is no 
cure or treatment. 
163 
Human Fertilisa- Permitted. Research licences can be granted 
tion and Embry- for any activity that is 'necessary or 
ology Act 1990. desirable' for the purpose of 'developing 
methods for detecting the presence of gene 
or chromosome abnormalities in embryos 
before implantation' (Sch. 2, para. 3(2)(e)). 
Embryos that have been the subject of re- 
search may not be returned to the womb 
(s. 15(4)). 
Unlike cloning and germ-line gene therapy, there is no consensus against 
(or, for that matter, in favour of) genetic diagnosis of the oocyte or non- 
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implanted embryo. Consequently, all four regulatory approaches to PGD 
are displayed throughout the EU. That is, 
Table 5.2 
Legislative Approach Non-Legislative Approach 
Permitted Prohibited Permitted by de- Prohibited by de- 
fault fault 
Denmark Austria Belgium 
France (unimple- Germany Finland 
mented Greece 
law) Italy 
Spain (unimple- Netherlands 
mented Spain (until 
law) 1988, law 
Sweden imple- 
UK mented) 
France (until 
1994 law 
imple- 
mented) 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Countries whose legislation permits PGD vary greatly in the level permis- 
siveness. 
The UK licensing authority, in accordance with the permissive legislation 
under which it operates, has licensed four centres to undertake PGD and its 
associated research. It has, however, advised the clinics that it licenses that 
sex selection for social reasons is unacceptable (see HFEA 1998, 
paragraph 7.20, p. 45). 
An example of the restrictive legislative approach can be found in the 
German Embryo Protection Act (EPA). 164 Under the EPA, it is an offence 
to fertilise a human egg for any purpose other than to start a pregnancy in 
the woman who produced the egg. Also, no embryo research is permitted- 
an embryo being defined as an egg from the time of fertilisation (uniting of 
the nuclei) and any totipotent cell. This has lead many commentators to 
suggest that diagnosis of cells after they lose their totipotency is not 
forbidden by the EPA. 16` Nevertheless, the clear intention of the EPA was 
to prohibit PGD, and, in 1996, an application to conduct Germany's first 
PGD trial was rejected by a local ethics committee on legal grounds. 
Whether PGD is acceptable in countries that do not have any specific 
legislation depends on the individual country's general legal and cultural 
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framework. For example, genetic diagnosis of the pre-implantation embryo 
is implicitly prohibited in Ireland by the Eighth Amendment to the Irish 
Constitution. 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right. 
In France, the law permits PGD, but its implementation requires the 
publication of a decree. Therefore, 
for the present, although preimplantation diagnosis should be author- 
ized, its practice is currently impossible in France. (Viville et al. 
1998, p. 1023)' 
The Spanish law, which expressly permits the use of assisted reproduction 
for the prevention and treatment of illnesses of a genetic or hereditary 
origin, "' has also not been implemented. But, due to a different legal and 
cultural climate, this has not prevented the use of the technique in Spain. 
Instead, it is performed subject to professional self-regulation. Interest- 
ingly, section 13 of the unimplemented law prohibits genetic selection for 
or against non-pathological characteristics. 
Many other European countries do not have laws regulating PGD at all. 
For example, in Belgium, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands, PGD is, in 
effect, permitted by default. 
Countries that have signed the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine will, however, have to take account of Article 14, which 
declares 
[t]he use of techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not be 
allowed for the purpose of choosing the future child's sex, except 
where serious hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided. 
No country is currently able to make a reservation to this provision based 
on its pre-existing law. 
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1.6 Prenatal diagnosis (PND) and abortion 
Table 6 
Country Legislation Legality of Abortion 
Austria S. 97 of the Penal Permitted 
Code. (a) within 12 weeks after conception; 
(b) to protect the mother's health; 
(c) where the child will probably be se- 
verely handicapped; or 
(d) if the mother was under age at the time 
of conception. ' 
PND is permitted for medical purposes 
only, with the written consent of the 
woman. ' 69 
Belgium Law of 3 April Permitted 
1990.10 (a) before 12 weeks, after counselling, 
where a doctor is convinced of the 
pregnant woman's distress and 
determination; and 
(b) up to birth, if the pregnancy would 
threaten the health of the pregnant 
woman, or there is a substantial risk 
that the child, if it were born, would 
have a serious and incurable disease. " 
Denmark Pregnancy Act Permitted 
1973. "' (a) on demand (and for free) within the 
first 12 weeks; 
Research: (b) after 12 weeks, where there are social 
Law No. 499 of reasons, the cause was rape or incest, 
12 June 1996. "` or where the child is in danger of 
hereditary problems or sickness during 
the embryonic stage; and 
(c) up to birth, if a serious risk exists for 
the health of the woman. "° 
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Finland 
France 
Clinical use: 
Regulated by ad- 
ministrative 
guidelines. 1' 
No information. 
Law 94-654 of 29 
July 1994, form- 
ing part of the 
Public Health Co- 
de. 
Decree No. 95- 
559 of 6 May 
1995. 
Decrees 97-578 
and 97-579 of 28 
May 1997. ' 
PND is permitted for women over 35 years 
and women with a risk of hereditary dis- 
eases. 176 
Permitted 
(a) before 12 weeks, if two physicians 
consider that the circumstances of the 
woman would place considerable 
strain on her, the pregnancy was 
caused by rape, the parents are 
severely limited in their ability to care 
for the child, or there is reason to 
believe that the child would be born 
retarded or would have or develop a 
serious illness or serious defects; 
(b) between 12 and 20 weeks of gestation, 
subject to the permission of the 
National Board of Medico-Legal 
Affairs; 
(c) before 24 weeks, subject to the permis- 
sion of the National Board of Medico- 
legal Affairs, if tests show the fetus is 
seriously ill or has a serious physical 
deformity, and 
(d) up to birth, where the woman's life or 
health is endangered. " 
Permitted 
(a) before week 10 on demand (Art. L-162- 
16 of the Public Health Code); 179 and 
(b) up to birth, if two physicians conclude 
that the pregnancy endangers the life of 
the woman, or the child to be born will, 
most probably, be affected by a par- 
ticularly serious incurable disorder rec- 
ognised as such at the time of diagnosis 
(Art. 13). ` 
PND procedures must be preceded by 
`medical genetic counselling', fulfilling 
certain stated aims (Art. L-162-16). "' 
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Germany 
Greece 
Criminal Code 
(s. 218). 
Law 1609/1986 
on Abortion. 
"' 
Ministerial deci- 
sion A3B/oik 
2799/25.2.87. '° 
Law 1036/1980 
on `Family Plan- 
ning'. 187 
1985 Decision of 
the Central Coun- 
cil of Health. '" 
Abortion is a criminal offence under s. 218, 
but the physician performing the abortion 
will not be prosecuted 
(a) up to the first 12 weeks, where the 
women has had counselling not later 
than 3 days before the termination 
(s. 218(a)(1)); 
(b) up to birth, where there is a risk to the 
woman's life, or a risk of perma- 
nent/serious physical or mental injury to 
the woman; which could not be averted 
by any other means (s. 218(a)(2)). 182 In 
practice, the risk of mental injury to the 
woman is interpreted to encompass 
abortion following PND, the emphasis 
being placed on the pregnant woman 
rather than the fetus. 183 
The pregnant woman does not commit an 
offence under s. 218 if the abortion is 
performed by a physician under 22 weeks, 
and if the woman has received counselling 
prior to the abortion (s. 218(a)(4)). Also, 
under this provision the court can refrain 
from convicting a pregnant woman, who 
was experiencing a situation of serious 
hardship at the time of the abortion. '` 
Permitted where 
(a) the embryo is less than 12 weeks old; 
(b) there are indications, based on PND, 
that the embryo to be born will suffer 
from a serious abnormality and the 
pregnancy has not passed the 24th week 
of gestation; 
(c) the pregnant woman is at risk of death 
or serious damage to her physical or 
mental health; or 
(d) pregnancy results from rape or incest. '" 
PND must take place in a state, university, 
or armed forces hospital. 19° 
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Ireland 
Italy 
The Eighth Am- 
endment to the 
Constitution (Art. 
40.3.3). 
Legge No. 194/78 
of 22 May 1978, 
Sull'interruzione 
Volontaria Della 
Gravidanza (i. e., 
law on the vol- 
untary interrup- 
tion of preg- 
nancy). X92 
Luxembourg Title of legislation 
unknown. 
Netherlands The Pregnancy 
Termination Act 
1981.19' 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
constitution as prohibiting abortion, unless 
there is a real and substantial threat to the 
life of the mother. 19' 
Abortion on demand is available within the 
first 12 weeks and 6 days of pregnancy, after 
which abortion can only be requested where 
(a) the continuation of the pregnancy or 
delivery could endanger the woman's 
life; 
(b) the fetus has malformations so serious 
that the woman's psychological or 
physical well-being is endangered, or if 
her well-being is endangered by other 
pathological processes; or 
(c) the pregnancy is the result of rape. 19` 
Permitted 
(a) before 12 weeks, if the pregnancy 
would threaten the woman's physical 
and mental health, is the result of rape, 
or if there is a substantial risk that the 
child, if it were born, would be very 
sick or be physically or mentally seri- 
ously handicapped; and 
(b) after 12 weeks, only if two medical 
doctors ascertain that birth of the child 
presents a serious risk to the health of 
the pregnant woman or the child to be 
born. ' 9° 
Permitted up to 24 weeks, if there is a 
danger to the woman and she has an authen- 
tic desire to terminate. '% In practice, this 
permits abortion on demand up to 24 weeks 
gestation. 
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Portugal 
Spain 
Arts. 140,141, 
and 142 of the 
Penal Code. 197 
Art. 417 bis of 
Law 9 of 5 July 
1985 (part of the 
Penal Code). 19R 
Royal decree No. 
2409 of 21 Nov- 
ember 1986. ' 
Permitted 
(a) within 12 weeks, if there are medical 
indications that it will remove the dan- 
ger of death or of serious and irrevers- 
ible damage to the pregnant woman's 
physical or psychological health; 
(b) up to 16 weeks, if there are serious 
indications that the pregnancy is the re- 
sult of crime against `sexual freedom 
and self-determination', 
(c) up to 24 weeks, if there are indisputable 
medical reasons indicating that the un- 
born child has a serious incurable dis- 
ease or congenital defect, and 
(d) up to birth, if it is `the only way to 
remove' the danger of death or of seri- 
ous and irreversible damage to the 
pregnant women's physical or psycho- 
logical health. 200 
Also, 
(e) the physician who approves the 
abortion cannot perform it; 
(e) the written consent of the pregnant 
woman is required; and 
(f) where the abortion is performed under 
(c) above, a technical commission of 
certification is needed. 201 
Permitted 
(a) during the first 12 weeks, if the preg- 
nancy is the result of a previously de- 
clared rape; 
(b) during the first 22 weeks, if two spe- 
cialists who are not performing the 
abortion diagnose a serious physical or 
mental abnormality/handicap; and 
(c) up to birth, to avoid a serious threat to 
the life or (physical or mental) health of 
the woman, if stated in a report submit- 
ted by a medical specialist who cannot 
be the physician performing or super- 
vising the abortion. 202 
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If an abortion is performed where none of 
these conditions exist, the woman will not 
be prosecuted. The person conducting the 
abortion in such circumstances might, 
however, be prosecuted (Art. 145). 203 
Sweden Abortion Act 
1995. 
of Permitted 
(a) up to 18 weeks; 
(b) up to the end of the 22nd week, if 
sanctioned by the National Board of 
Health and Welfare (and only when 
there is no reason to believe that the fe- 
tus is viable); and 
(c) up to birth, where the pregnancy might 
gravely imperil the woman's life or 
health or the fetus is so gravely dam- 
aged that it is not viable. 204 
UK (excluding Abortion Act 
Northern 1967 (s. 1(l )), as 
Ireland) 206 inserted by s. 37 
of the Human 
Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 
1990. 
All pregnant women are offered 
information on abortion, and PND. 20` 
Permitted 
(a) up to 24 weeks, where the continuation 
of the pregnancy will involve risk, 
greater than if the pregnancy were ter- 
minated, of injury to the woman or her 
family; and 
(b) up to birth, to save the life of the 
woman, to avoid permanent injury to 
her physical or mental health, or to 
avoid the birth of a severely handi- 
capped child. 
The legality of PND is largely dependent on the legality of abortion within 
particular jurisdictions, and abortion is the most comprehensively regulated 
area falling within the terms of this report. All but one of the fifteen 
member states of the EU have specific legislation. Ireland is the exception, 
as abortion is covered by the constitution rather than legislation, and the 
constitution (as interpreted by the Supreme Court) prohibits abortion 
unless there is a real and substantial threat to the life of the pregnant 
woman. 
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Thus, with the exception of Ireland, all EU countries have decriminalised 
abortion where certain conditions are satisfied, up to a specific period of 
gestation-the most permissive being the legislation of the UK and the 
Netherlands, which in practice allow abortion on demand up to 24 weeks 
gestation. In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal, abortion is generally restricted to gestational 
development of less than 12 weeks. In France the period is ten weeks, in 
Italy, up to 12 weeks and 6 days, and, in Sweden, the period is up to 18 
weeks. 
Within these countries, abortion is available for specific reasons beyond 
this period of gestation. For example, abortion is permitted up to birth to 
protect the mother's life in all EU countries. For our purposes, it is inter- 
esting to see that diagnosis of a serious genetic condition, '-, )' following 
PND, provides grounds for abortion. In fact, abortion following PND is 
permitted 
(a) up to birth in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and the UK; 
(b) up to 24 weeks in Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal; 
(c) up to 22 weeks in Spain, and Sweden; 208 and 
(e) up to 12 weeks in Luxembourg. 
In some countries, use of PND is limited by other legislative conditions. 
For example, in France and Germany, PND cannot be used for selecting the 
gender of the child, except in cases of incurable sex-linked hereditary 
diseases (see MacKellar 1997, p. 10; and Lansac 1996, p. 1847). 
In sum, abortion following the diagnosis of a genetic disorder is permit- 
ted, subject to specific conditions and gestational development, in all the 
countries of the EU, with the possible exception of Ireland. 
2 Pro-life, pro-choice, and compromise positions 
Having reviewed the legal position within the EU countries, we will now 
develop a framework for analysing the moral and philosophical issues. 
In another paper in this volume, one of us offers a three-fold ideal-typical 
description of the political landscape. '`09 This classifies the political 
landscape according to the level of intrinsic moral status granted to the 
embryo-fetus-that is, according to the moral status that is granted to the 
human embryo and fetus (hereafter embryo-fetus) by virtue of the charac- 
teristics possessed by it. 
The first position, the `pro-life' position, is characterised as granting full 
moral status to the embryo-fetus from the moment of conception. The 
second, the `pro-choice' position, is depicted as granting no intrinsic moral 
status to the embryo-fetus, until at least birth. The third, the `compromise' 
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position, represents the view that the intrinsic moral status of the embryo- 
fetus increases with gestational development until it obtains full moral 
status at birth or beyond. In other words, the political landscape is classi- 
fied according to whether intrinsic moral status is denied to the embryo- 
fetus (the `pro-choice' position), granted in full to the embryo-fetus (the 
`pro-life' position), or granted on a gradualist scale (the `compromise' 
position). 
This framework can be applied to the regulation of human reproduction, 
genetic diagnosis, and gene therapy only insofar as such regulation has 
implications for the embryo-fetus. 210 Its application is, however, far from 
straightforward, because the classification leaves open the possibility that 
the embryo-fetus might have moral status that is indirectly derived from 
the moral status of those with intrinsic moral status (hereafter vicarious 
moral status). This is especially important for the `pro-choice' position, 
because it means that this position does not commit its supporters to the 
idea that anything can be done to the embryo-fetus with impunity. 211 
Each of these positions has implications for the regulation of the tech- 
niques under discussion. A regulatory structure adopting the `pro-life' 
position would characteristically prohibit any non-therapeutic interference 
with the embryo-fetus. There is one possible exception to this, and that is 
where the `pro-life' position is underpinned by a moral theory that aggre- 
gates or averages the interests of those with intrinsic moral status. For 
example, if it is possible to adopt a utilitarian position that grants full 
moral status to the embryo-fetus from conception, such a position could 
permit non-therapeutic interference with the embryo-fetus where the 
interests of a being with full moral status are outweighed by the aggregate 
(or average of the) interests of other beings with intrinsic moral status. We 
are not sure whether any such moral theory exists. 
A `pro-choice' regulatory structure would permit such interference, 
unless its restriction is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of those 
with full moral status; whereas the `compromise' position would prohibit 
such interference except where it is necessary to protect the moral status of 
those with higher moral status. 
For present purposes, we will concentrate on the implications of this 
classificatory framework for PGD and abortion. 
With PGD, it is characteristically intended that the oocyte or pre- 
implantation embryo will be rejected if the diagnosis were to indicate the 
presence of an undesired gene or chromosomal abnormality. This is 
important, because, with the exception of the PGD technique of polar body 
biopsy on the first polar body, which is performed on a sister cell of the 
oocyte, all PGD is performed on the pre-implantation embryo. Therefore, 
with this exception, a non-utilitarian `pro-life' proponent would be 
opposed to PGD. The `pro-life' position's opposition to PGD is strength- 
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ened where the technique involves the removal and consequential destruc- 
tion of totipotent cells (as in blastomere biopsy), which some would argue 
are individual embryos. 
A regulatory structure adopting the `pro-choice' position has the poten- 
tial to be far more permissive. Since this position does not grant the 
embryo-fetus intrinsic moral status, it will permit PGD, unless its prohibi- 
tion is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of those with intrinsic 
moral status. Such vicarious considerations will restrict or prohibit PGD 
where it threatens to inflict harm on those with intrinsic moral status that is 
greater than the harm that will result from denying potential parents (who 
also have intrinsic moral status) access to PGD. In short, a `pro-choice' 
regulatory structure will start from the presumption that PGD is permitted, 
rebutting this presumption only insofar as the embryo-fetus is shown to 
have sufficient vicarious moral status. 2'' 
The `compromise' position, sits between the `pro-life' and `pro-choice' 
positions only on the issue of intrinsic moral status. Although the gradual- 
ist intrinsic moral status granted to the pre-implantation embryo might be 
minimal it is still moral status, so the presumption of such a regulatory 
structure must be against the use of PGD, this presumption only being 
rebuttable by considerations that seek to protect the moral status of a being 
with higher intrinsic moral status. 
The impact of these three positions on the regulation of abortion is just 
as complex. A non-utilitarian `pro-life' position, being the most predict- 
able of the three, will prohibit abortion irrespective of the gestational 
development of the embryo-fetus except, perhaps, where the life of the 
mother is in danger. In contrast, the `pro-choice' position will permit 
abortion up to the gestational point where the vicarious protection given to 
the embryo-fetus overrides the mother's right to abort. This point will 
depend on the strength of the vicarious considerations, the presumption 
being in favour of permitting abortion. Since pregnancy is potentially very 
harmful to the mother, the vicarious arguments are less likely to prohibit 
abortion than PGD. Nevertheless, they are still capable of severely limiting 
its availability. 
The `compromise' position will, in addition to granting gradualist intrin- 
sic moral status to the embryo-fetus, grant vicarious moral status to the 
embryo-fetus. The mother will, however, have much greater moral status 
than the embryo-fetus. Thus. although a 'compromise' regulatory structure 
would start from the presumption that abortion is prohibited, one would 
expect abortion to be available at least during early gestation. 
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2.1 Applying this framework 
Before applying this framework to the regulatory positions described in 
Part One of this report, we need to highlight a number complications. 
One complication is that where the protection offered to the embryo-fetus 
is 'gradualist'-where gradually greater protection is granted to the 
embryo-fetus as it approaches birth-this does not necessarily mean that 
the country in question has adopted a `compromise' position. It might have 
adopted a 'pro-choice' position, because vicarious moral status can also be 
gradualist. For example, where an embryo-fetus is protected as a means of 
protecting the sensitivities of those with intrinsic moral status, if these 
sensitivities increase with the development of the embryo-fetus, the corre- 
sponding vicarious protection offered to the embryo-fetus will also 
increase. 
A related complication is that it is possible for the `compromise' posi- 
tion-which starts from a presumption in favour of the embryo-fetus-and 
the `pro-choice' position-which starts from a presumption against the 
embryo-fetus-to grant the same degree of protection to the embryo-fetus. 
However, we suspect that in practice, the regulatory structure will tend 
towards its underlying presumption. That is, a `pro-choice' regulatory 
structure, in practice, is likely to be more permissive than a `compromise' 
regulatory structure. 
Bearing in mind these complications, we offer the following line diagram 
for the values in Table 7 below, where the numbers represent our 
impression of a location on the scale from the 'pro-life' position to the 
'pro-choice' position. For the reasons just given, the following attributions 
cannot be described as more than impressionistic descriptions of the 
tendency of the regulation. '" 
Pro-life Compromise Pro-choice 
13 5 
The country tending most strongly towards the `pro-life' position for all the 
techniques under discussion is Ireland. The Eighth Amendment to the Irish 
Constitution encapsulates the tenets of the `pro-life' position, as it 
(implicitly or explicitly) prohibits abortion (except in the extreme circum- 
stances laid down by the constitutional court), embryo research, PGD, and 
PND. 
The other countries are more difficult to categorise in terms of these 
ideal-typical perspectives. The country tending most strongly towards the 
pro-choice position is the UK, which permits PGD (with the exception of 
sex selection for social reasons), permits abortion on demand up to 24 
weeks gestation, permits abortion following PND up to birth to avoid the 
birth of a severely handicapped child, and even permits the deliberate 
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creation of embryos for research. The UK does, however, limit embryo 
research to a maximum of 14 days. 
Table 7 
PGD Embryo Research Abortion 
Austria, Germany, 1. Austria, France, 1. Ireland 
Ireland Germany, Ireland 
2. Portugal 2. France, Italy, Lux- 
embourg, Portugal 
France (1994 law), 3. Sweden, Spain 3. Austria, Belgium, 
Sweden, Spain Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Spain 
4. Belgium, Finland, 4. Sweden, Denmark, 
Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, UK 
Italy, UK 
Belgium, Denmark, Fin- 
land, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, UK 
Luxembourg, Portugal 
? Luxembourg, Neth- 
erlands 
The Spanish legislation tends strongly towards the 'compromise' position. 
This legislation permits embryo research only for very limited purposes, 
restricts abortion during the first 12 weeks to circumstances where the 
pregnancy is the result of a previously declared rape; and permits abortion 
following PND during the first 22 weeks only where the embryo-fetus is 
diagnosed as having a serious physical or mental handicap. 
Many of the countries are difficult to classify because they either grant 
gradualist' protection-which could be due to granting the embryo-fetus 
gradualist vicarious moral status or gradualist intrinsic moral status-or are 
prima facie inconsistent. By inconsistent, we mean that some countries 
seem to have adopted different approaches for different techniques. For 
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example, the French legislation's prohibition of non-therapeutic embryo 
research tends towards the `pro-life' position, but its legislative acceptance 
of PGD and PND tends more towards the 'compromise' or `pro-choice' 
position. Moreover, Austrian and German legislation prohibit embryo 
research and PGD, suggesting a tendency towards the `pro-life' camp, " 
but permit abortion and PND, suggesting a tendency towards the 
'compromise' or `pro-choice' camp. This inconsistency appears to be the 
result of a clash of positions within the political arena. 
Italy represents the most striking example of the effects of interaction 
between these positions within the political and legislative arenas. In Italy, 
the Catholic Church's `pro-life' position has had enough political influence 
to undermine any `pro-choice' or `compromise' legislation in all areas 
except abortion. It has not, however, been influential enough to enshrine 
itself in legislation. Consequently, the influence of the `pro-life' camp has 
created a de facto position that ironically appears to tend towards the 'pro- 
choice' camp. 
Evidently, the regulatory approach is the product of various social, 
political, legal, and philosophical influences within a particular polity. It 
might be the result of a political compromise; social, historical, or cultural 
contingencies; or the adoption of a particular normative position. 
Since this is not an empirical project, we will concentrate on analysis of 
the philosophical perspectives underpinning the adoption of a particular 
position. In other words, we are not going to examine events within the 
political process. Instead we will explore the types of philosophical posi- 
tions that could underpin our ideal-typical pro-life, pro-choice, and 
compromise positions. 
2.2 Grounds for possession of intrinsic moral status 
There are a number of potential grounds for the possession of intrinsic 
moral status. The three that are particularly pertinent for our purposes are 
those that grant intrinsic moral status to those who are 
(a) sentient; i. e., capable of experiencing pain; 
(b) human; i. e., members of Homo sapiens, or 
(c) persons/agents; i. e., able to act for purposes constituting their reasons 
for action. 
A `pro-life' position must ground possession of intrinsic moral status on a 
property gained at conception, such as being human or a potential person, 
if these concepts are defined in a certain way. " Where the latter is taken to 
be the ground for this position, having such potential must be held to be 
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sufficient for full moral status, rather than sufficient for moral status that is 
proportional to the degree of potential. ='b 
A `pro-choice' position must ground possession of intrinsic moral status 
on a property allegedly not possessed by the embryo-fetus, such as person- 
hood. Obviously, the idea that the embryo-fetus has any intrinsic moral 
status as a potential, partial, or possible person must be rejected by 
supporters of the `pro-choice' position. 
The `compromise' position must be underpinned by a theory that 
grounds possession of intrinsic moral status on a property/relation that is 
had in degrees in proportion to gestational development, possession of 
which in full is held to be sufficient for full moral status. Such positions 
include those resting intrinsic moral status on degrees of 
(a) possible personhood, i. e., holding that intrinsic moral status is 
proportional to the degree of evidence supporting the hypothesis that a 
being is a person; 
(h) sentience; i. e., holding that intrinsic moral status is proportional to the 
degree of sentience possessed; 
(c) potential personhood; i. e., the view that intrinsic moral status is 
proportional to the degree of potentiality possessed; or 
(d) approach to an attribute, such as personhood; i. e., holding that intrinsic 
moral status is proportion to the degree of approach to the relevant 
attribute. 
Even a brief perusal of the national and international debate reveals rheto- 
ric that is capable of simultaneously appealing to more than one of these 
positions. 
At the international level, one only has to look at the pronouncements of 
international instruments, such as the Council of Europe's Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article I of which demands that parties to 
it 'protect the dignity and identity of all human beings'. The World Health 
Organisation has also adopted this type of language in its 1997 resolution, 
which declares that 
[t]he use of cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethi- 
cally unacceptable and contrary to human integrity and morality. 
(Quoted in UNESCO 1998. Our emphasis) 
Such rhetoric will appeal to those adopting any of the positions outlined 
above. One reason for this cross-positional appeal is that all the positions 
that we have outlined grant full intrinsic moral status to adult human 
beings, and the rhetoric used can suggest that it is the moral status of adult 
human beings that is being protected. Moreover, the term `human' is 
ambiguous as between advocating the view that moral status rests on 
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membership of the human race (i. e., human in the biological sense) and 
advocating the view that moral status belongs to persons (i. e., human in a 
moral sense). 
This rhetorical device is standard in the language used by national 
bodies. For example, the published opinions of the Portuguese National 
Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences"' are loaded with such phrases. In 
one Report, the National Council asserts that 
science does not itself represent a value that may be compared to 
human life and dignity, which it is meant to serve. (National Council 
of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1995, p. 3. Our emphasis) 
In another, the National Council asserts 
[t]he cloning of human beings, because of the problems it raises 
concerning the dignity of the human person, the equilibrium of the 
human species and life in society, is ethically unacceptable and must 
be prohibited. (National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 
1997b, p. 2. Our emphasis) 
In the UK, the HGAC and HFEA (1998a, p. 16) have asserted that cloning 
raises serious ethical issues, concerned with human responsibility and 
instrumentalisation of human beings. (Our emphasis) 
Even where the language appears to be committed to a particular stance, 
further analysis often reveals more universal appeal. For example, the 
Warnock Report, which formed the basis of the UK Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990, asserts that the embryo of the human species 
ought to have a special status' (Warnock 1985, paragraph 11.7), albeit less 
than that of a living child or adult. Prima facie, this statement is gradualist, 
suggesting a 'compromise' position. However, notice the references to 'the 
human species' (suggesting advocacy of the view that intrinsic moral 
status is grounded in membership of the human race), and the fact that 
gradualist conclusions can also appeal to those from the 'pro-choice' camp 
(due to vicarious considerations). 
What this means is that apparent consensus is often not really consensus 
at all. 
Consequently, to some extent, it is naive to look to regulatory structures 
for an understanding of the various philosophical positions in play. There 
are of course exceptions-Ireland has clearly adopted the Roman Catholic 
Church's `pro-life' position grounding moral status on being human in the 
biological sense. But the regulatory approaches of other EU countries are 
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more likely to be the result of political compromises than the adoption of a 
theoretically pure perspective. 
This point is also pertinent to the regulation of medically assisted repro- 
duction. The techniques that legislatures have been concerned to regulate 
are not those of medical assistance to reproduce as such, but those that are 
non-traditional or have evoked, or have the potential to evoke, political 
tension. It is hard to imagine any other ground on which the techniques 
that are universally subject to legislative eligibility criteria can be distin- 
guished from those that are not. " 
This difference between the techniques subject to legislative eligibility 
criteria and those that are not certainly cannot be accounted for on the 
basis of financial considerations, because, to take one example, surgical 
repair of damaged fallopian tubes is far more expensive than donor 
insemination. Moreover, such a position does not seem to serve to protect 
the intrinsic moral status that the gamete might develop because the impo- 
sition of eligibility criteria actually prevent the gamete from developing 
into a being that will be granted moral status by any of the positions that 
we have discussed. 
The divergence between the EU countries over whether those who are 
not part of a heterosexual couple should have access to assisted reproduc- 
tion, must be the result of the same kinds of forces, or factors other than 
the intrinsic moral status of the embryo- fetus. "' 
In short, looking at the regulatory structures within the EU tells us more 
about the compromises that have or have not been made in the legislative 
arena or the socio-political context of the polity, than it does about the 
underpinning ground for possession of intrinsic moral status. It also high- 
lights the limitations of our attempt to classify the philosophical 
approaches to these issues. As we stated earlier, not all the philosophical 
differences reduce to different perspectives on the level of, and ground for 
possession of, intrinsic moral status. A more comprehensive treatment of 
this philosophical diversity would have to classify the positions available 
on issues such as the availability of access to assisted reproduction, the 
moral status of the pre-conceptus, and the level of moral harm evoked by 
parental attempts to influence the characteristics of offspring. 
Some of the moral issues will be raised in more detail below, but we do 
not present an overview of the different approaches that could be taken on 
these issues. Such an overview would take more time and space than we 
have available here, and require the development of numerous other 
frameworks. 
We do, however, wish to make a few preliminary points. First, a frame- 
work for classifying the different approaches on the relevance of mari- 
tal/relational status and sexual orientation to access to assisted reproduc- 
tion will have to encompass a number of very diverse perspectives. Posi- 
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tions on this issue can be underpinned by theories attaching very different 
values to considerations such as the interests of the child, the significance 
of the `standard' family, the interests of minorities, the relevance of sexual 
orientation, and the relevance of cultural traditions. Creating a framework 
that accurately captures the essence of this diversity will be no easy task. 
Second, since it is usually possible to adopt a position that raises issues 
falling outside of any particular framework, it will be difficult to construct 
additional frameworks that have sufficient breath without losing their 
elucidatory force. 
3 Conclusion 
In sum, the regulation of assisted reproduction, genetic diagnosis, and 
genetic therapy across the EU reveals many areas of convergence and 
divergence. For a start, the EU countries are split between legislative and 
non-legislative regulatory mechanisms, and between permissive and 
restrictive approaches. The stringency of the approach adopted does, to 
some extent, seem to be consistent within each country, so that those 
countries that are restrictive regarding embryo research are also restrictive 
regarding PGD, and so on. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, 
all the EU countries, except Ireland, have adopted permissive legislation 
governing abortion and PND. Moreover, cloning and germ-line gene 
therapy have attracted almost universal prohibition. 
Analysing these issues in terms of the ideal-typical `pro-life', `pro- 
choice', and 'compromise' positions illustrates the extent to which political 
compromise has shaped the regulation of the techniques under discussion. 
This analysis has also revealed a number of potentially fruitful avenues for 
further study. 
On an empirical level, further research could usefully address at least 
three issues. First, studies are needed to discover the extent to which 
legislatures are influenced by particular philosophical perspectives. 
Second, research is needed to determine whether the regulatory approaches 
adopted within particular countries reflect the attitudes and perceptions 
held by the general populace. Third, empirical research is often necessary 
to apply a philosophical perspective because, to take one example, the 
force of arguments for possession of vicarious moral status rests on 
empirical hypotheses. 
On an analytic level, any deeper philosophical analysis must be 
conducted from particular philosophical positions rather than groups of 
philosophical positions. This is not to suggest that any further analysis 
must adopt one particular theory; we merely suggest that further analysis 
would be most profitably directed at exploring the implications of particu- 
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lar philosophical positions one at a time, and, indeed, we are jointly and 
individually currently undertaking this task with regard to Alan Gewirth's 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). 221 As we have argued elsewhere, 
in its application, this rights-based theory grants intrinsic moral status to 
beings that are possible agents (see Beyleveld and Pattinson 1998 and 
2000), 22 and, as a result, belongs to the `compromise' camp. 221 
There are many moral issues raised by assisted reproduction, genetic 
diagnosis, and gene therapy, which will be addressed differently by differ- 
ent moral theories. 
One issue is whether there is a moral right to reproduce, and if so, what 
the strength of this right is and whether it includes a right of access to 
medically assisted reproduction . 
22` There is also an issue about whether any 
such right is purely negative (i. e., imposing duties of non-interference 
only) or is also positive (i. e., imposing duties of assistance). This issue is 
important for determining whether access to assisted reproduction ought to 
be provided by the state. 
Another issue requiring consideration rests on the claim that PGD is 
superior to PND because it avoids the thorny and emotive issue of abortion 
(see Beyleveld 1999). The validity of such a claim will depend on, inter 
alia, the legitimacy of abortion, the moral status of the oocyte and pre- 
implantation embryo, and the weight given to the fact that PGD makes it 
easier to influence the characteristics of one's offspring and more difficult 
to prevent parents acting for certain motives. 
In fact, all of the techniques under discussion enable parents to influence 
the characteristics of their offspring. This raises the question of whether it 
is morally legitimate to deliberately manipulate the characteristics of one's 
offspring before its birth and, if so, whether this applies to all characteris- 
tics or is dependent on whether the characteristic is relevant to the posses- 
sion of intrinsic moral status. Further, there is also the question whether the 
moral legitimacy of a parental preference for or against characteristics that 
are irrelevant to the possession of intrinsic moral status is dependent on the 
characteristic in question. For example, is it relevant that some character- 
istics-such as Down syndrome and Huntington's disease-hinder the 
future offspring's range of future purposes without affecting the 
offspring's possession of intrinsic moral status by virtue of being human, 
sentient, or an agent? 225 Also, does it matter whether the characteristic in 
question can be treated, or influenced by other means, such as education, 
after birth? 
Techniques that have yet to be performed on humans, such as cloning by 
nuclear substitution and germ-line gene therapy, raise other issues. For 
example, is it morally permissible to attempt to clone a human by somatic 
cell nuclear transfer given that it took 277 failed attempts to clone Dolly? 
Is it morally permissible to attempt germ-line gene therapy on humans 
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given the difficulties highlighted by the `Beltseville pig' incident, where 
the genetic switch that was supposed to trigger the production of growth 
hormone was permanently switched on, resulting in an obese pig with 
many disorders? In short, the question is: how efficient does a technique 
have to be before it can legitimately be applied to create a human child? 
Given the number of issues evoked by these techniques, it is not surpris- 
ing to find that the EU displays such great divisions. Indeed, it is surprising 
to find any consensus at all. 
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See Garanis-Papadatos 1998, p. 1; Gunning and English 1993, p. 172; and 
Nielsen 1996a, p. 309. 
See Schenker 1997, p. 176. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 17. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 17. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 17; and Schenker 1997, p. 176. 
See, MacKellar 1997, p. 18; Nielsen 1996a, p. 309; Nielsen 1996b, p. 332; and 
Gunning and English 1993, p. 155. 
The latest proposal is the unified text of 27 January 1998, which has been 
drawn up by the Commission for Social Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies 
(see Ferrando 1998, p. 4). 
See Ferrando 1998, p. 2; and Schenker 1997, p. 176. 
We would like to thank Roberto Mordacci for expanding our understanding of 
this Code. 
See Ferrando 1998, p. 2; Gunning and English 1993, p. 155; and MacKellar 
1997, p. 18. 
See Nielsen 1996a, p. 309. 
As translated by Fernando Article 5 grants access to 
adult couples of different genders, married or living in stable conditions, 
with a potentially fertile age and, however, not older than fifty-two. 
(Ferrando 1998, p. 4) 
See Ferrando 1998, pp. 4-5. 
Gunning and English 1993, p. 157. 
See Schenker 1997, p. 174. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997, especially p. 1 and p. 71. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997, p. 14; and Schenker 1997, p. 174. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997, p. 14 and p. 71. 
However, Decree-Law No. 319/86 of 25 September 1986, covers the 
collection, manipulation, and preservation of sperm. (See Oliveira 1996, 
p. 68. ) 
See National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1997c. 
Information provided Joao Carlos Loureiro. 
It was challenged by the Popular party on enactment. 
It was contested that the law was unconstitutional because although it 
addressed matters of human rights it had not been made an organic law 
but had been enacted as ordinary law. (Gunning and English 1993, p. 164) 
See also, Gunning 1998, p. 100; and Nielsen 1996a, p. 309. It now appears 
that implementation of the Act has begun. (Information provided by Jennifer 
Gunning. ) 
See Gunning 1998, p. 101. 
262 
-11, 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Sý 
11 ! 
v 
CC 
50 
(-, 
iR 
59 
CIO 
61 
See Sutton 1996, pp. 44-45; Nielsen 1997, p. 130; MacKellar 1997, p. 27; 
Schenker 1997, p. 176; and Gunning and English 1993, p. 164. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 27. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 extends to Northern 
Ireland (except s. 37 amending the Abortion Act 1967): s. 48. 
See Latham 1998a, p. 94. 
The financial burdens placed on those seeking access should also be noted. In 
the UK, provision of assisted reproductive services by health authorities is 
given a low priority, so that only two clinics are wholly funded by the NHS. It 
has been suggested that, as a result, 
Many couples are having to remortgage their homes to pay for treatment. 
(Latham 1998a, p. 94) 
Clearly, this means that financial means act as de facto eligibility criteria for 
many couples. This is to be contrasted with the situation in France, where 
couples who fulfil the legislative eligibility criteria `will be able to be treated 
regardless of income for in France treatment for "sterility" is fully reimbursed 
by the State' (Latham 1998a p. 96). Similarly, in Germany, social security 
covers IVF for up to three attempts for married couples (Nielsen 1996a, 
p. 311). 
The French legislation also prevents post-mortem insemination. 
Part 3 of the HFEA's Code of Practice provides detailed guidance for centres 
on this requirement to consider the welfare of the child. 
There are two sections of Law No. 460 dealing with information and consent 
in relation to assisted reproduction generally. However, these provisions are 
not concerned with eligibility as such. (Information provided by Nina Schultz- 
Lorentzen. ) 
See Fernando 1998. In fact 
[d]uring the legislative period which ended in 1992, there were 100 bills 
concerning the regulation of Reproductive Technology, not one of which 
has been passed into law. (Nielsen 1996, p. 337) 
See Kriari-Catranis 1997, p. 58; and Gunning and English 1993, p. 147 and 
P" 171 
See Kriari-Catranis 1997, p. 58: and Gunning and English 1993, p. 148 and 
p. 171. 
See Bernat 1993, p. 501. 
See, for example, Gunning and English 1993, p. 148. 
See Schotsmans 1998. 
See Gunning and English 1993, p. 148 and p. 172. 
See Schenker 1997, p. 181. For a wider discussion, see Gunning and English 
1993, p. 148. 
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Information provided by Guido Pennings. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 6; EGE 1998a, p. 3; Nielsen 1996b, p. 329; and 
Gunning and English 1993, p. 172. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 6. 
See Gunning and English 1993, p. 151; MacKellar 1997, p. 6; and Nielsen 
1996a, p. 140. 
See Kriari-Catranis 1997, p. 58; and Gunning and English 1993, p. 151. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 6. 
This Act was enacted on 9 April 1999, and comes into force on 1 November 
1999. (Information provided by Raimo Lahti. ) It was based primarily on the 
report prepared by a Working Party on Medical Research on Humans, Human 
Embryos and Fetuses in 1994. On the wider implications of this report, see 
Lötjönen 1998. See also Hynninen 1998; and EGE 1998a, p. 3. 
See Lötjönen 1999, p. 1. 
See Lansac 1996; and EGE 1998a, p. 3. 
See Lansac 1996, p. 1846; Nielsen 1996b, p. 329; and Latham 1998b, p. 236. 
The Comite National d'Ethique (National Committee of Reproductive 
Medicine, Biology and Antenatal Diagnosis) advises the Minister of Health on 
which clinics to license. (See Lansac 1996, especially p. 1846. ). See also, EGE 
1998a, p. 3; Nielsen 1996b, p. 329; and Latham 1998b, p. 236. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 9. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 9; and EGE 1998a, p. 3. 
See EGE 1998a, p. 3. 
See Gunning and English 1993, p. 154; and EGE 1998a, p. 4. 
See Gunning and English 1993, p. 154; Sutton 1996, p. 43; EGE 1998a, p. 4; 
Bernat 1993, p. 501; Kriari-Catranis 1997, p. 5; and Schenker 1997, p. 181. 
See Bernat 1993, p. 501. 
See Garanis-Papadatos 1998, p. 1; Gunning and English 1993, p. 172; and 
Schenker 1997, p. 180. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 17; and Attorney General vX[ 199211. I. R 1. 
The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution is quoted in the text 
following table 2.1. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 17. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 17. 
See Ferrando 1998, pp. 4-5. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 18. 
See Ferrando 1998, p. 4. 
See Gunning and English 1993, p. 172. The EGE Secretariat appears to be 
mis-informed as it states that the `Dutch legislation forbids any research on 
embryos' (EGE 1998a, p. 5). 
Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997. 
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Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. 
See Oliveira 1996, p. 68. 
See National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1995, especially p. 10. 
See Gunning 1998, p. 100. It now appears that implementation of the Act has 
begun. (Information Provided by Jennifer Gunning). 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 25. 
See Sutton 1996, p. 45; and Gunning and English 1993, p. 164 and p. 173. 
See Sutton 1996, p. 45. 
See Sutton 1996, p. 45; and Gunning and English 1993, p. 164 and p. 173. 
See Sutton 1996, p. 45. 
See Gunning and English 1993, p. 164. 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
See HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E. 
Information provided by Nina Schultz-Lorentzen. See also, HGAC & HFEA 
1998b, Annexe E; and UNESCO 1998, p. 10. 
See UNESCO 1998, p. 10; and HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E. 
See Lötjönen 1999, p. 1. 
See HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E. 
See HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E. 
See UNESCO 1998, p. 10. 
See HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E. 
See HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E; and UNESCO 1998, p. 10. 
Anyone who artificially creates a human embryo with the same genetic 
information as another embryo, a fetus, an adult human being or a 
deceased person, will be punished by a term of imprisonment up to five 
years or by a fine. (Translated in Winter 1997, p. 191) 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
See Dalla-Vorgia 1996, p. 281. 
Sheikh states that somatic cell nuclear transfer might be affected by the 
Control of Clinical Trials Act 1987 and the Control of Clinical Trials and 
Drugs Act 1990, if they are not 'too vague in their nature to include the 
procedure' (1997, p. 95). 
See UNESCO 1998, p. 10. 
Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
See UNESCO 1998, p. 10. 
See UNESCO 1998, p. 10. 
Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. 
Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. 
By implication, see National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1997b, 
p. 2. 
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See National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 1997b, p. 2. 
Title V of the Penal Code is translated in Lacadena 1996. 
See UNESCO 1998, p. 11; and HGAC & HFEA 1998b, Annexe E. 
See the text following Table 3. 
We use this definition of cloning throughout. Thus, when we claim that certain 
countries prohibit cloning we are claiming only that they prohibit techniques 
involving the deliberate creation of a human being that is genetically identical 
to another human being or has the same nuclear gene set as another human 
being. 
See the original `Dolly paper': Wilmut et al. 1997. When this paper was 
published some commentators suggested that Dolly's DNA might have been 
derived from a `stem cell', rather than a somatic cell as such. However, this 
suggestion has been dispelled by the successful cloning of two calves, and 50 
mice at two different institutions. 
In a jointly written consultation document they state 
[t]he nuclear substitution of an embryo, or any cell whilst it forms part of 
the embryo is expressly prohibited by the HFE Act. Embryo splitting and 
nuclear replacement of eggs are not expressly prohibited, but as both 
involve the use or creation of embryos outside the body, they fall within 
the HFE Act and therefore come under the jurisdiction of the HFEA. 
(HGAC & HFEA 1998a, paragraph. 5.2, p. 10) 
And in the final report they state 
[t]he Department of Health and the HFEA have taken Counsel's advice on 
this issue. As a result, both Ministers and the Authority reject this position 
and are content that the Act does allow the HFEA to regulate nuclear 
replacement into an unfertilised egg through its licensing system. (HGAC 
& HFEA 1998b, paragraph 3.4) 
Quoted in Science and Technology Committee 1997, p. xii. 
This has lead the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology to declare 
[i]t is not satisfactory for issues as momentous as this to be left until they 
are decided through test cases. We recommend that the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act should be amended to ensure that the 
Roslin technique [i. e., the Dolly technique] comes within its scope. 
(Select Committee for Science and Technology 1997, p. xii) 
See also, HGAC & HFEA 1998b, paragraph 3.8, and paragraph 9.2. 
However, the HGAC & HFEA have recommended that the UK government 
consider explicitly banning reproductive cloning using any technique (see 
HGAC & HFEA 1998b, paragraph 9.2). 
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Jürgen Simon expands upon this point in his commentary on this report, and 
argues that the German EPA has at least one other flaw. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine opened for 
signature on 4.4.97, and its additional protocol opened for signature on 
12.1.98. The ten EU countries that are signatories are Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden. Belgium has not signed it because of the dissensus within public 
opinion (see Schotsmans 1998, p. 2). Germany has not signed it because it 
considers it to be too lax, while the UK considers it to be too restrictive. 
Provisions implicitly prohibiting cloning include Article 1, which requires 
parties to the Convention to 'protect the dignity and identity of all human 
beings', and Article 18, which states that the creation of human embryos for 
research purposes is prohibited. 
These provisions are important, because it is possible to sign the Convention 
without signing the protocol. Should a country, such as the UK, which has pre- 
existing laws on cloning, not wish to prohibit cloning it can make a reservation 
to these provisions of the Convention by invoking Article 36. 
Information provided by Ghislaine van Thiel. 
Moreover, the European Commission's former 'Group of Advisers on the 
Ethical Implications of Biotechnology' has condemned cloning, and so has the 
World Health Assembly (see HGAC & HFEA 1998b, paragraph 7.2). Jürgen 
Simon, in his commentary on this report, also points to the European 
Parliament's March 1997 resolution. 
This Declaration was unanimously adopted by the General Conference on 1I 
November 1997 (see UNESCO 1998). 
It might be argued that the disincentive is minimal, because the results of any 
investment can be protected by other intellectual property mechanisms, such 
as breach of confidence. However, patent protection has particular appeal to 
commercial organisations and the condemnatory nature of the political will 
behind the Directive is itself a disincentive. 
See Kriari-Catranis 1998, p. 53. 
See Rendtorff 1998, especially p. 83. 
See Lötjönen 1999, p. 2. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 9. 
See Sutton 1996, p. 44. 
See Gunning 1998, p. 100. It now appears that implementation of the Act has 
begun. (Information provided by Jennifer Gunning. ) 
See Sutton 1996, p. 45; and Gunning and English 1993, p. 164. 
The Declaration also declares that all procedures affecting an individual's 
genome should only be undertaken after 'rigorous and prior assessment of the 
potential risks and benefits' (Article 5(a)). 
See also conclusion 6 of the Bilbao declaration, which declares that, 
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Until scientific advances so allow, and as the exact functions of even one 
gene are not known, it is prudent to establish a moratorium on the 
alternation of germinal cells. (Bilbao Declaration 1994, p. 5) 
The term `embryo' is not defined under the Austrian legislation. (See EGE 
1998b). 
There is, however, a Higher Council on Human Genetics established under the 
Crown Order of 7 November 1973 (see Schotsmans 1998, p. 2). 
See Schotsmans 1998, p. 2. 
Information provided by Nina Schultz-Lorentzen. 
Information provided by Salla Lötjönen. 
See Schenker 1997, p. 178. 
See Hynninen 1998, pp. 5-6. 
See Viville et al. 1998, p. 1022. This still appears to be true. (Information 
provided by Jennifer Gunning. ) 
See Viville et al. 1998, p. 1022. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 10. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 10. 
See Garanis-Papadatos 1998, p. 2. 
See Garanis-Papadatos 1998, p. 2. 
See Schenker 1997, p. 178. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997, p. 31. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 27. 
For a more detailed discussion of the German position vis-ä-vis the regulation 
of PGD, see Jürgen Simon's commentary following this report. 
However, according to information provided by Hille Haker, some scientists 
hold that on the third day (when biopsies for PGD are usually made) no 
totipotent cells exist; others, such as Regine Kollek, consider the cells 
totipotent at the 6-10 cell stage. 
See also Fasouliotis 1998, p. 2242. It appears that this is still the situation in 
France. (Information provided by Jennifer Gunning. ) 
S. 1 of Act 35 of November 1988. S. 12(1) explicitly authorises PGD to test 
for hereditary diseases in order to treat them or advise against transfer to the 
womb. 
See Mandry 1998, p. 34; and Nentwich 1997. 
Information provided by Hille Haker. 
See Moulin 1996, p. 27. 
See Petersen 1996, p. 79. Called the Abortion Act by Nielsen 1997, p. 132. 
Information provided by Nina Schultz-Lorentzen. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 3. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 5; Nielsen 1997, p. 132; and Moulin 1996, p. 27. 
Information provided by Nina Schultz-Lorentzen. 
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See Rendtorff 1998, especially p. 83. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 7. 
See Lansac 1996, p. 1847. For more detailed discussion of Decree No. 97-578, 
see Jürgen Simon's commentary which follows this report. 
See Sutton 1996, p. 43. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 8; and Lansac 1996, p. 1847. 
See Lansac 1996, p. 1847. 
Information provided by Sabine Michalowski. 
Under the previous law, abortion was permitted for medical indications 
including hereditary diseases. This provision was removed because it was 
thought to have eugenic implications. (Information obtained from Schoenke 
and Schroeder 1997, and Sabine Michalowski. ) 
Information obtained from the same sources as above. 
See Dalla-Vorgia 1988, p. 4; and Commission of the European Communities 
1995. 
See Dalla-Vorgia 1988, p. 4. 
See Dalla-Vorgia 1988, p. 3. 
See Dalla-Vorgia 1988, p. 3. 
See Commission of the European Communities 1995; and MacKellar 1997, 
p. 15. 
See Dalla-Vorgia 1988, p. 4. 
As Finlay CJ put it, 
I 
... conclude that the proper test to 
be applied is that if it is established as 
a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as 
distinct from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the 
termination of her pregnancy, such termination is permissible, having 
regard to the true interpretation of Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 of the 
Constitution [as inserted by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution]. 
(Attorney General vX [1992] 1 1. R. 1, pp. 53-54) 
The `real and substantial risk to the life' of the mother was held to include the 
risk of suicide, so that on the facts of AG vX the fourteen year old girl, X, was 
permitted to travel to England for an abortion. 
On abortion in Ireland, see also Madden 1997, p. 103; MacKellar 1997, 
p. 17; and Rendtorff 1998, p. 101. 
Information provided by Roberto Mordacci. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 18. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 19. 
See Health Council of the Netherlands 1997, p. 50; and Van Thiel 1996, 
p. 103. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 20. 
Information provided by Joao Carlos Loureiro. 
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See Gabarrön et al. 1997, p. 68. 
See Gabarrön et al. 1997, p. 68. 
See Loureiro 1996, p. 87; and information provided by Joao Carlos Loureiro. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 23, and information provided by Joao Carlos Loureiro. 
See Gabarrön et al. 1997, p. 68; and MacKellar 1997, p. 25. 
See Gabarrön et al. 1997, p. 68. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 27. For the position under the previous Abortion Act 
1974, see Sutton 1996, p. 4. 
See MacKellar 1997, p. 28. 
Neither s. 37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 nor the 
Abortion Act 1967, extend to Northern Ireland. See s. 48 Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990, and s. 7(3) Abortion Act 1967, respectively. 
This is not to suggest that diagnosis of a serious non-genetic condition cannot 
legitimate abortion under the legislation of these countries. 
In Sweden, abortion following PND is given no special status under the law. 
See Beyleveld 'The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus', in this 
volume. 
See below. 
Vicarious moral status can also increase the protection granted to the embryo- 
fetus by the 'compromise' position. The effect that vicarious considerations 
have on the 'pro-life' position is more complex. This depends on the 
underpinning moral theory. If the 'pro-life' position is underpinned by a 
deontological moral theory, vicarious considerations can be ignored because 
the embryo-fetus already has the maximum moral status possible (i. e., full 
intrinsic moral status). However, if the 'pro-life' position is underpinned by a 
position which applies an aggregate calculus (such as utilitarianism), the 
derivative considerations can be decisive in determining our obligations 
towards the embryo-fetus. 
See Beyleveld 1999 for a number of vicarious arguments that can be used to 
grant protection to the embryo-fetus. 
We are, of course, aware that the possibility of a utilitarian position granting 
full moral status to the embryo-fetus from conception introduces a level of 
complexity that our line diagram largely ignores. 
Even the title of the German Act, the 'Embryo Protection Act', suggests a 
'pro-life' position. 
One apparent problem with grounding the 'pro-life' position is that none of the 
possible grounds seem to appear at conception unless they are defined in an 
almost question-begging way. 
The 'pro-life' position is defined as granting full moral status to the embryo- 
fetus from the moment of conception. Either this is to be redefined as granting 
full moral status from at least the moment of conception, or the ground for 
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such status (whether it is being human or a potential person/agent) cannot be 
perceived as applying to the unfertilised gamete. 
The National Council is a statutory body set up under Law No. 14/90 of 9 June 
1990. 
Exclusion of GIFT using non-donated gametes in the UK Act is particularly 
interesting because GIFT involves more health risks to the mother than IVF 
(see Health Council of the Netherlands 1997, p. 30). 
The exclusion of non-heterosexual couples cannot be based on the moral 
interests of the embryo-fetus, because it is not even plausible to claim that only 
heterosexual couples make good parents. For example, one study found that 
the children of single mothers do not suffer from parental failure any more 
than other children; at most they suffer from the consequences of social and 
financial problems faced by most single mothers (see Golombok and Rust 
1986, especially p. 182). Moreover, 
[t]he only British study in this area (which supports similar studies in the 
U. S. ) [Golombok, Spencer, and Rutter 1983,55] reports no statistically 
significant differences in psychiatric state between children with lesbian 
or heterosexual mothers and the incidence of disorder was similar to that 
found in heterosexual two-parent families. (Madden 1996, p. 16) 
As we pointed out above, the French legislation appears to be inconsistent 
because it prohibits non-therapeutic embryo research but permits PGD. 
However, unlike Austria and Germany, the French legislation has adopted an 
approach that is consistent between PGD and PND. 
Gewirth (1978) presents the argument to the PGC, which is defended against 
objections published up to 1990 in Beyleveld 1991. 
See also Beyleveld `The Moral Status of the Human Embryo and Fetus' in this 
volume. 
See Beyleveld ibid. Also, on the application of the PGC, see Beyleveld, 
Quarrell, and Toddington 1997. 
For a discussion of this issue from a Gewirthian perspective, see Pattinson 
1998. 
See Beyleveld, Quarrell, and Toddington 1997 for a Gewirthian perspective on 
some of the issues raised by this question. 
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